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ABSTRACT 
 
This perspective paper combines institutional and industrial network theory to 
develop a framework for analysing organisational legitimacy. The main subject, 
Nokia China, is found to be sensitive to network-legitimating initiatives, with 
consequences that accommodate multiple, conflicting stakeholders′ interests in 
China′s politically sensitive and protective telecommunications market. This 
paper offers new insights into institutional isomorphism that is manifested 
empirically as incremental conformity to regulative processes, institutional 
norms and cognitive knowledge and meanings within the environment, thereby 
extending commonly held views of institutional theory to include organisational 
legitimacy in industrial networks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite massive investment, foreign firms have struggled to do business in 
China's telecommunications market. Such failures can be explained by 
companies' inabilities to acquire organisational legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
garnered when firms successfully market their competencies to key stakeholders 
by conforming to regulative processes, institutional norms and cognitive 
meanings within the environment. This paper seeks to address the question of 
how subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) create and realise their 
organisational legitimacy in China's telecommunications market by combining 
the concept of organisational legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1996) with 
institutional theory (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Child & Tse, 2001; Loo, 2004) and 
network theory (Hakansson, 1982; Ford, Gadde, Hakansson & Snehota, 2003; 
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Hakansson, Harrison & Waluszewski, 2004). The analysis therefore encompasses 
the international environment through behavioural theory (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Axinn & Matthyssen, 2002) and firms' management of 
international network resource dependency and activity transformation (Ford et 
al., 2003; Hakansson et al., 2004).  
 
This paper contends that the determination of organisational legitimacy is made 
by the network stakeholders to which the organisation must respond and on 
whom it is dependent for survival. Compliance is usually achieved through 
commonly used strategies and practices that often emerge from the interactions 
of firms and other stakeholders within the network (Edelman, 1992). This 
process of the "collective making of meaning" within the network, shaped by the 
politics of propriety, trust, and awareness (Nielsen & Rao, 1987) determine the 
survivability and profitability of these firms and the network. While 
disagreements between firms are not unexpected, a properly functioning internal 
network and dynamics that revolve around cooperation and trust with external 
stakeholders are crucial for maintaining inter-organisational network legitimacy. 
 
The paper contributes to the existing knowledge on organisational legitimacy in 
two important ways. Firstly, it extends our understanding of organisational 
legitimacy by introducing the concept of organisational network legitimacy. 
Secondly, it examines the process of organisational network legitimacy by 
proposing a theoretical model that combines both institutional and network 
theory. Both theories are essential for a general definition and understanding of 
the concept and process of organisational network legitimacy, a point the author 
will return to later. The model is based on the interaction among: (i) the 
organisation's reputation, industry and network dynamics; (ii) market, relational, 
investment, and social legitimacy initiatives (Dacin, Oliver & Roy, 2007), and    
(iii) the network legitimacy outcome at one point in time and over time. This 
model is depicted in Figure 1. The paper's central tenet is that, for MNEs without 
any local market presence, their reputations are crucial in any legitimacy-seeking 
agenda. This agenda will, however, be influenced by industry and network 
dynamics exhibiting varying degrees of stakeholders' relational interdependencies, 
connectedness and conflicting demands. A MNE's reputation and its interface 
with industry and network dynamics in turn influence the firm's market, 
relational, investment and social legitimacy initiatives via the firm's 
complementary nature of resource and activity transformational mixes with other 
firms in the network. Thirdly, based on a single case design from Nokia China, 
and through the systematic combining of the main characteristics involving a 
continuous movement between an empirical world and a model world (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002), the paper provides some empirical support for the proposed 
interactions among concepts comprising the model depicted in Figure 1. Some 
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managerial implications and concerns for MNEs operating in China's politically 
sensitive and highly regulated telecommunications market are also addressed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Organisational legitimacy: An institutional and network perspective 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides some background 
on institutional theory and organisational network legitimacy. Next follows a 
detailed and important contextual-setting description of China's State power, 
industry, network dynamics and structure. This sets the scene for the discussion 
that follows in which a conceptual framework is proposed, followed by the 
paper's research methodology. An interpretative case analysis of Nokia's Chinese 
organisational network legitimacy is presented, allowing for the manifestation of 
the company's behaviour (Yin, 2003) at any given point in time and over time. 
The paper concludes with some final observations on the practical challenges 
and implications for MNEs pursuing an organisational network legitimacy 
agenda in China's politically sensitive and highly regulated telecommunications 
sectors. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND ORGANISATIONAL NETWORK 
LEGITIMACY 
 
Institutional theory has been widely used in studying the adoption of particular 
organisational practices or strategies (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). A central tenet of institutional theory is that 
organisations need to achieve and maintain environmental legitimacy, defined as 
"a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions" (Suchman, 1995). In order to survive, organisations 
conform to the rules and belief systems in their environments (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) because this isomorphism earns them 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse, 1996). Differences in external 
environments result in the heterogeneity of organisational practices across 
countries (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Hadjikhani, Lee 
Organisation's 
reputation
 
Industry and 
network dynamics 
Market, relational, 
investment and social 
legitimacy initiatives 
Organisation's 
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& Ghauri, 2007). Under these circumstances, it could be argued that establishing 
and maintaining legitimacy in multiple host environments remains one of the 
most critical strategic issues for MNEs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova & 
Roth, 2002).  
 
For example, while the rights of publicly listed and privately-owned firms to 
operate freely is generally not questioned in the West, in China, the basic and 
wide acceptance of the right of MNEs to operate does not automatically occur. 
Western companies have therefore failed despite making massive investments 
(Vanhonacker, 1997; Kurlantzick, 2002) because of inappropriate and ineffective 
efforts to build legitimacy. Others simply find themselves in a hopeless situation 
once they are labelled illegitimate (Vanhonacker, 1997). Not surprisingly, firms 
with higher levels of legitimacy management experience will have a more precise 
view on what is needed to pursue and navigate a successful legitimacy-seeking 
agenda. Prior legitimacy experience, in turn, results in more opportunities to enter 
into future inter-partner alliances and partnerships, presumably due to the 
development of a firm′s reputation and its knowledge of network characteristics. 
Put simply, MNEs that manage to survive long enough in China are more likely 
to have conformed to legitimacy pressures, while those that do not conform will 
not survive. 
 
The type of legitimacy needed by a firm and, in turn, the specific targets or 
constituents to which a firm must appear legitimate, will be driven by the firm's 
objectives in a particular context, the dynamics of the environment, and the 
firm's characteristics (Dacin et al., 2007). In a network environment, firms' 
legitimacies are linked together by their performance of industrial activities (e.g., 
marketing, exporting, production and logistics), employment or consumption of 
various types of resources (e.g., R&D, financial, brand equity, knowledge) or 
production of other resources (see, for instance, the work by Low, Johnston & 
Wang 2007; Low & Johnston, 2005). Over time and many interactions, firms 
become connected together to form a structured network of interdependent 
relationships and connectedness. As such, new firms seeking network legitimacy 
confront the liability of newness and foreignness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Zaheer, 
1995) because established firms have defined and entrenched roles and/or 
network identities. These identities and/or roles are reflected in a firm's structural 
network positions (much like competitive position in the economic marketplace) 
in terms of the degree of relational interdependencies through resource and 
activity specialisations. In this way, network structures are as much a process as 
they are a structure, being constantly shaped and reshaped by the actions of firms 
(Nohria, 1992; Sydow & Windeler, 1998; Dittrich, Jasper, Valk & Wynstra, 
2006).  
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As previously noted, the determination of network legitimacy is made by the 
stakeholders to which the organisation must respond and on whom it is dependent 
for survival. Compliance is achieved through commonly used strategies and 
practices that often emerge from the interactions of firms with other firms and/or 
network stakeholders (Edelman, 1992). While disagreements between firms are 
not unexpected, a properly functioning internal network dynamic that revolves 
around cooperation and trust is crucial for maintaining inter-firm network 
legitimacy. If existing inter-firm network legitimacy must change, it is because 
the network no longer possesses the resources needed to meet stakeholders' 
changing expectations. Major external structural, regulatory, and institutional 
changes and expectations may also force these stakeholders' to act. The powerful 
forces of network conservatism that have successfully internalised these external 
expectations will therefore come under increasing pressure. This scenario then 
provides the pretext and  context in which new organisational legitimacy is 
needed and/or existing legitimacy is realigned. In this way, success depends on a 
firm's ability to match its legitimacies with stakeholders' new and changing 
expectations — each having an interpretation of what constitutes the firm's 
network legitimacy.  
 
Broadly speaking, legitimacy may be sought through market, relational, 
investment and social legitimacy (Dacin et al., 2007). Market legitimacy refers to 
the rights or qualifications to operate in the market. For a firm that is new to the 
market, the rights to operate in that market are not automatically given because of 
the liability of foreignness, especially for firms with low relative standing. A firm 
may thus seek out an alliance with a legitimate firm in that market to help ensure 
endorsement and receptiveness by the government, suppliers, or customers 
(Dacin et al., 2007). To maintain and possibly enhance their market legitimacies, 
firms also actively seek on-going relational legitimacy through merger and 
alliances activities with strong local partners. This helps firms navigate the 
unfamiliar environment better, especially an environment that is undergoing 
structural changes with frequent government interference. Relational legitimacy 
also allows for the collaborative pooling of technical, marketing, production and 
sales resources, thereby sending out strong signals regarding a firm's commitment 
and worthiness as an attractive relational partner. Any initial negative attitude 
towards a firm could then be managed better. Unlike relational legitimacy, which 
is partner-specific, a firm can also seek investment legitimacy, which serves to 
legitimate the worthiness of the firm's overall business activities. For example, 
firms that demonstrate a propensity for investing in a market that actively seeks 
foreign investments and technical expertise (thus mimicking the country's 
policies) stands a strong chance of gaining the country's endorsement. Finally, a 
firm also seeks social legitimacy, which will be particularly significant in 
institutional environments where a socially responsible image is vital for the 
firm's survival (Dacin et al., 2007). To enhance their social legitimacy, firms 
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often undertake public welfare initiatives in education and training, and local and 
regional developments with community organisations and the government. 
Lacking social endorsements, firm may face oppositions in their efforts to 
establish market, relational and investment legitimacy.  
 
 
CHINA'S STATE POWER, INDUSTRY AND NETWORK STRUCTURE 
 
In the last decade, China's economic growth has been unprecedented. Despite the 
current global financial crisis, China remains a beacon of hope for Western 
economies experiencing recessions. Economic growth, however, is achieved in 
an environment that is characterised by government interference, particularly in 
politically-sensitive sectors like telecommunications. This is due mainly to the 
nation's desire to become a global technological force (and hence the need to 
protect the sector) and concurrently create globally competitive indigenous firms. 
In this sense, and in keeping with the manuscript′s contextual network setting, as 
institutional settings (including any consequential contextual change) within 
which networks evolve, the State and its institutions have and will continue to 
provide a framework of rules and regulations within which local and MNEs have 
to play. 
 
A brief review of the institutionally-focused Chinese political and business 
literature leads to three important observations. Firstly, the State has historically 
protected, inspired and nurtured both State and non-State enterprises, though 
with overall control of resources in a command economy, because the enterprises 
can produce maximum production and provide more resources for State power. 
But the State's power structure, with its operation-based economic and political 
relations, has corresponding institutional costs that are directly related to a 
State's authority (Yang, 2005). The State therefore represents major sources of 
uncertainty for firms because it controls critical resources and opportunities that 
shape firms' industrial and competitive environments (Jacobson, Lenway & Ring, 
1993; Baron, 1995). Secondly, as the nation progresses, reforms have not been 
without institutional costs. While authority is fully retained, institutional costs 
are zero. However, politics with zero institutional costs do not exist outside of 
abstract theory (Yang, 2005). Indeed, as the State struggled to impose its 
authority through coercive commands and the announcement of ambiguous 
policies, the reforms are coming under increasing global scrutiny since China 
joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Thirdly, and despite the 
rhetoric of a hands-off approach, the reality is that there is more rather than less 
government interference in business and increased control of enterprises. In the 
telecommunications sector and similar politically-sensitive sectors, such as 
resource and aviation, enterprises are seen as only political tools in the passage 
of economic construction and technological supremacy (see, for instance, the 
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work by Low & Johnston, 2007). The special type of relationship between 
politics and the economy means that the political leaders' attitudes and their 
conduct directly determine the fortunes of enterprises (Yang, 2005).  
 
Amidst the backdrop of these institutional and contextual settings, the capacity 
of MNEs to generate and implement their legitimacy-seeking agendas takes 
place. That is, the State has and remains to be the primary driving force for 
economic, political, social and technological reforms. It is a key institutional 
agent affecting the operations of firms, particularly State-owned and linked 
carriers, equipment manufacturers and software developers. More importantly, 
the State's powerful administrative and regulatory institutions oversee the 
trajectory of the State′s control and management of the telecommunications 
sector to the extent that the power of these institutions is the same as the market 
and economic powers (Yang, 2005). Through these institutions, administrative 
bureaucracy reflects the way that the State manages and retains institutional 
economic power by way of administrative power. Bureaucracy is in many ways 
a special monopoly combining State power with market strength in the nation's 
economic transition (Yang, 2005).  
 
For example, in terms of political hierarchy, the right of access to the 
telecommunications sector falls under the purview of the influential 
administrative monopoly, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MII). 
The centralisation of control in the MII has, over time, enhanced the State′s 
effort to protect the sector through local and international market exposure and 
competition. Despite market-oriented reforms, the State has increased its control 
over companies' businesses through political interference. Rather than stepping 
back and letting the market operate, the economic and technological reforms in 
telecommunications continue to have strong political overtures. This is evident 
in the political appointment of chief executives and top management teams in 
this sector. In this way, telecommunications enterprises could be seen as nothing 
more than politically expedient vehicles in the development of the nation's 
economic construction and technological leadership.  
 
Additionally, the structure of the industries also forms a key institutional sphere 
affecting the operations of firms in China (Child & Tse, 2001). For a long time, 
firms and government were welded together into a closed system of networked 
relationships through social, political and economic ties of State ownerships and 
reciprocal benefits that took into account the need to control and manage 
economic performance and nationalist zeal. At the macroeconomic level, political 
and economic ideology drives the formulation of industrial policy that affects 
firms' performance — directly through resource allocations and indirectly 
through concerted efforts in creating a legitimate organisation. While there has 
been many recent institutional variations and changes in the administrative 
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structures of the telecommunications sector (Liang et al., 2004; Zhang, 2001), 
reforms are incremental under the circumstances that the accumulation of the old 
institution and power structure remain temporarily unchanged. The structures of 
the sector were made primarily by State powers, and now the State intends to 
transform these structures (Child & Tse, 2001.) This means that the State will 
shift to safeguarding its interest in the sector, evident by the latest round of 
regulatory reforms. These are evolutionary changes that have and will remain the 
character of these reforms.  
 
Attempts in changing the market structure take time because administrative 
institutions are deeply politically embedded. Changes are also difficult because 
they could result in potential increases in unemployment. This may compromise 
the principles of social pragmatism (Lin, 1998), which could undermine the 
creation of a "harmonious socialist society" (Schubert, 2008). While pressures 
from stakeholders will undoubtedly affect institutional reform initiatives, the 
responses so far have generally been mixed in terms of the timing and speed in 
which these initiatives are implemented (Luo, Sivakumar & Lim, 2005; Zhang, 
2003). While one may question the multi-level networked system of political and 
economic ownerships and ties that blurs the line between privately owned 
enterprise and government-linked enterprise, it nevertheless brings about 
stability in a politically sensitive telecommunications market. 
 
Viewed somewhat differently, the rules of the game in defining the basic rules of 
competition and cooperation and formulating the ownership structure will 
remain fundamentally unchanged for now. These are aimed at maximising 
revenue for the enterprise and protecting the industry and the firm since the basis 
of economic exchanges between enterprises figures prominently in the nation's 
transition from a command to a market economy. Under these circumstances, 
amidst the interwoven network of ever-slowly changing political and economic 
ideology, subsidiaries of multinational companies must somehow navigate their 
organisational network legitimacy agenda. This is both intriguing and perplexing 
at a theoretical and normative level. Fundamentally, they face the daunting 
challenge of identifying the State's changing political and business ideologies in 
a transitional economy, including changing expectations as existing networks in 
the telecommunications market are reconfigured. This is an onerous and 
complex task, given the nation's deeply embedded institutional norms, values 
and governances. The lack of transparency processes in the formulation of 
policies, conflicting national imperatives, and the general absence of uniform 
copyright and intellectual property law, makes the task seemingly impossible.  
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In China's transition from a command to a market economy, powerful 
administrative and regulatory institutions continue to affect local enterprises and 
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises' performance in their selection of 
enterprise resource allocations and activity transformation roles. The political 
hierarchy and the State's interference remains, essentially masking the State′s 
economic reform efforts. These institutional interferences beg the questions of 
how MNEs develop and manage their organisational network legitimacy-seeking 
agenda, when organisational legitimacy is produced, and how it is maintained. 
 
To begin with, MNEs face the challenges of overcoming their "liability of 
newness/foreignness" (Stinchcombe, 1965; Zaheer, 1995) as they seek to 
conform to unfamiliar Chinese stakeholders' legitimacy expectations. Their 
market, relational, investment, and social legitimacy tenure will, at best, be slow 
and incremental in nature, and, at worst, will be relatively short-lived if they fail 
to conform to these expectations. Their motives are also viewed with suspicion, 
especially when they do not have records of relational and investment 
commitment in China. As a core intangible resource, a favourable organisational 
reputation may therefore mitigate local suspicions over MNEs' motives. 
Representing the affective or emotional reaction that customers and others have 
toward a firm, and defined as the overall emotive estimation of a firm by its 
constituents (Fombrun, 1996), a reputation creates competitive advantage when 
competitors are not able to match the prestige and esteem a particular reputation 
creates (Shrum & Wuthnow, 1988). A reputation thus affords the stakeholders an 
opportunity to evaluate the firm as part of the social construction process. Issues 
concerning the various legitimating aspects of maintaining a reputation as part of 
the social construction process therefore cannot be ignored. The interface 
between a reputation and organisational legitimacy is a work-in-progress.  
 
MNEs also need to analyse the local network dynamics — much like market 
analysis — starting with an analysis of the existing inter-firm relationships. These 
relationships stem primarily from MNEs' efforts to match their resource and 
activity complementarities with other firms in the network to achieve economic 
benefits. MNEs seeking entry into the network seek similar benefits. But, because 
not all networks have the same benefits, there is priority among MNEs in   
seeking out local firms with complimentary assets. The greater the asset 
complementarities are, the greater the benefits from combining their assets under 
the rubric of inter-partner alliances, partnerships, technology transfers, sales and 
marketing agreements will be. Information about potential local network partners 
is therefore a key resource. This does not, however, understate the significance of 
developing the ability to assess and predict the complementarities of assets 
amidst the backdrop of China's economic transition and its implications for 
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MNEs, particularly with respect to the current and future approved features of 
institutional practices and norms. 
 
It therefore stands to reason that MNEs' organisational network legitimacies must 
be continuously justified and re-aligned. This is described derivatively as 
political, economic, technological, social, and other manoeuvring processes that 
MNEs undertake to ensure quality and fit with institutional norms, values and 
beliefs. Following Dacin et al. (2007), legitimacy may take the form of market, 
relational, social and investment initiatives and/or imperatives. Market legitimacy 
occurs when a firm tries to establish or maintain its rights or qualifications to 
operate in a specific market (Dacin et al., 2007). Relational legitimacy is 
motivated by a firm's desire to increase its attractiveness (Dacin et al., 2007) via 
strategic alliances and partnerships. Social legitimacy occurs when such firms 
form partnerships with government and community organisations in tackling 
social issues (Dacin et al., 2007), such as environmental degradation or training 
and education. Investment legitimacy refers to the worthiness of a firm's business 
activities in the eyes of corporate insiders, such as a parent firm's board of 
directors, executives, venture capitalists and shareholders (Dacin et al., 2007).  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study was based on a single case design that allows for the development of 
theory through in-depth insights of empirical phenomena and their contexts. 
Notably, the case of Nokia China uses "systematic combining", where the main 
characteristics involve a continuous movement between an empirical world and a 
model-based world (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Through a continuous interplay 
between analysis and the data gathered over a period of time, the initial proposed 
model has since changed and evolved. In this way, the existing theory of 
legitimacy from an institutional and network perspective has since been 
moderated and contextualised, especially when new data on the evolution of 
Nokia's network legitimacy become available. The fact that the Chinese 
telecommunications sector is politically sensitive and heavily regulated provides 
good access opportunities to data through readily observable trends, 
developments via announcements of government policies, and intervention 
initiatives. This may involve the central government′s involvement as the nation 
strives to become a global technological power.  This occurs amidst the backdrop 
of structural reforms, the nation's obligatory WTO commitments, and the 
protection of stakeholders' interests. These characteristics thus present the sector 
as an ideal "critical" or "polar" case such that the "process of interest is readily 
observable" (Eisenhart, 1989).  
 
An institutional and network perspective 
127 
Specifically, contextual analytical observations and insights regarding the 
evolution of Nokia's organisational legitimacy were made possible through 
publicly available documents via Internet sites, company reports, trade journals, 
and commentary by industry researchers and analysts. Through an inductive and 
interpretative content analysis of these materials and through methodological 
contextualisation via industry experience, empirical descriptions and 
generalisations were provided. This was achieved through the use of a single case 
design, focusing on Nokia China, allowing for the study of interactions among 
the proposed variables and the empirical evidence. Indeed, the case allows for the 
manifestation of the company's behaviour (Yin, 2003) in terms of its network 
legitimacy initiatives at any given point in time and over time. The evolving 
insights suggesting that "findings are unstable over time" do not apply in this 
case since the author has tried to make the interpretations situation-specific (see, 
for instance, the work by Dubois & Gadde, 2002). We next examine this process 
through an inductive and interpretative case analysis of Nokia China (NC).  
 
 
CASE ANALYSIS OF NOKIA CHINA  
 
Nokia China (NC) established its presence in China in 1985. It is currently the 
leading supplier of mobile and broadband network systems and mobile phones in 
China. China also represents an integral part of Nokia's global manufacturing and 
research and development (R&D) networks, and the company is now the largest 
exporter in China's mobile telecommunications industry. NC now has more than 
50 offices and two R&D centres in China, employing over 4,700 people. It 
registered an accumulative net sales volume of EUR5,898 million in 2007, an 
increase of       20% as compared with EUR4,913 million in sales in 2006. These 
are impressive numbers establishing China as NC's largest market. Put simply, 
NC, with its strong organisational reputation in wireless mobility, has performed 
impressively in a highly protected and regulated Chinese telecommunications 
market. NC's success is due in large part to its ability to articulate and navigate its 
legitimacy agenda via market, relational, investment and social legitimacy 
initiatives deemed acceptable to the sector's stakeholders. We next examine some 
of these legitimacy initiatives.  
 
NC'S MARKET LEGITIMACY 
 
By now, it is reasonable to assume that NC has earned the rights and/or 
qualifications to operate in China. The company has high relative standing and 
desirability in terms of its global and local reputation in wireless mobility. In yet 
another attempt to reinforce its market legitimacy in 2003, NC merged its four 
existing joint ventures in China. Its largest Chinese joint venture partner is a local 
company called the Putian Corporation. According to Ouyang Zhongmou, 
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Putian's CEO, "the merger will not only increase opportunities for us in China, 
but also allow us to improve our competitiveness outside of China," thereby 
echoing the nation's drive to be a major telecommunications player. Well aware 
of the Chinese government's policy to boost its local telecommunication software 
and hardware telecommunications industry, NC has also over the years explored 
opportunities to maximise growth and global competitiveness for all of the 
parties in the local value chain. In 2005, through its cooperation with the 
government, NC contributed to the creation of an estimated 25,000 jobs among 
the company's cooperation partners, local sub-contractors and suppliers. With the 
realisation that China is now one of the largest mobile phone markets in the 
world, one would also expect NC to increase its market legitimacy efforts, 
carefully crafting its well-earned Chinese reputational rights. The company will 
also continue to explore opportunities to cooperate with local industries, partners 
and government organisations through key relational, investment and social 
legitimacy initiatives.  
 
 
NC'S RELATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 
NC has also actively sought relational legitimacy through alliances and merger 
activities that allow for the collaborative pooling of local technical, marketing, 
production and sales resources. In pursuing its relational legitimacy, NC has 
followed the right wireless technology in conjunction with some of the sector's 
key stakeholders. For example, in 2005, NC and China Putian agreed to set up a 
3G joint venture to focus on R&D, manufacturing and the sales of 3G network 
solutions for Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) and Time 
Division Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA). Not only 
is TD-SCDMA China's home-grown third-generation mobile wireless technology 
that competes with the US CDMA2000 system backed by Qualcomm Inc. and 
European WCDMA backed by Ericsson and Nokia, but also through its alliance 
with China Putian, NC is now working with a company that is among the first 
companies to pass the TD-SCDMA field trials that were organised by the 
Chinese Ministry of Information Industry. China Putian is also one of the 
initiators of the Chinese TD-SCDMA Industrial Alliance and owns the 
international bidding agent qualification, which is awarded by the Ministry of 
Commerce.  
 
Earlier, in 2003, Nokia signed an agreement for cross-licensing WCDMA-related 
patents covering the manufacturing and sales of WCDMA infrastructure 
equipment globally with Huawei, thereby lowering the threshold of technology 
transfer. Huawei is China's largest, indigenous telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer. This milestone agreement allows Huawei to compete in the global 
WCDMA marketplace, WCDMA being a technology that has been adopted by 
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the majority of the world's mobile carriers. Nokia's relational legitimacy, which 
allows for the collective pooling of collaborative technical and sales efforts in the 
TD-SCDMA space, predates an earlier relationship that NC had with China 
Mobile, culminating in the signing of EUR580 million frame agreements for 
GSM/GPRS network expansion in China in 2006. Nokia's strategic cooperation 
with China Mobile started in 1994. NC thus appears to have carefully crafted and 
leveraged its relational legitimacy by choosing complementary partners, 
including China Telecom and China Unicom, the nation's largest 
telecommunications operator and second largest wireless operator, respectively, 
through inter-firm sharing knowledge routines that have evolved over time. This 
has happened despite the disruptive character of emerging wireless technologies 
that make extrapolations of their eventual market prospects a futile exercise. 
 
 
NC'S INVESTMENT LEGITIMACY 
 
Besides market and relational legitimacy, Nokia has also legitimised the 
worthiness of its overall Chinese business activities through its investment 
legitimacy by adhering to the State's policies, thereby gaining the State's 
endorsement. For example, while China has historically been seen as a 
manufacturing and sourcing hub, there are increasing expectations that China is 
also seen as a science and technology hub. While NC remains one of the largest 
Chinese mobile communications manufacturers and exporters, the company has 
also become one of the largest foreign invested enterprises in China, with the 
merging of its manufacturing joint ventures and the production of CDMA 
handsets in China in 2003. This merger underscores two key State policies: 
increased R&D investment in China, especially in 3G technology and particularly 
in TD-SCDMA, and improvement of the nation's competitiveness globally.  
 
By reaffirming its commitment to TD-SCDMA in late 2008, Nokia made it 
known that it supports the development of China's home-grown third-generation 
mobile wireless technologies. As Colin Giles (2008) said at the event, "Our goal 
is to not only develop TD-SCDMA products that can deliver outstanding user 
experiences to consumers, but also to work with operators, chipsets providers, 
developers and all parties along the value chain to support the creation of a 
vibrant TD-SCDMA ecosystem in China". Earlier in 2006, Nokia announced the 
construction of its China Campus and the selection of the Beijing Economic-
Technological Development Area (BDA) as its location. The campus will consist 
of Nokia's Chinese headquarters, R&D centres, and mobile phone manufacturing 
bases. Attendees of the ground-breaking ceremony included Nokia's CEO, 
officials from the central Chinese government, the Beijing government, the 
Beijing Economic-Technological Development Area and other Nokia partners. In 
the latter part of 2007, NC is expected to host over 1,500 of Nokia staff from 
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R&D, sales and manufacturing operations, pre-production, logistics, sourcing and 
manufacturing operations. Through these investment initiatives, NC hopes to 
assist China in realising its ambitions, particularly in wireless mobility 
technology and handsets. This assistance is what China has been looking for, but 
has seldom acknowledged until recently.  
 
 
NOKIA'S SOCIAL LEGITIMACY  
 
China aspires to join the big league of world technology leaders. This is not 
going to happen anytime soon because of China's low investments in research 
and development as compared with global telecommunications giants. While 
there is high incentive to increase R&D spending, there is an even greater 
incentive for Nokia to help train its citizens. Local manufacturers and carriers 
could then become more global and powerful, developing their technical 
expertise and global brand name. The quid pro quo is that, while investment in 
education and training is costly, it is nevertheless necessary if Nokia is to gain the 
social endorsement of political decision makers and the constituents needed to 
establish its market, relational and investment legitimacy.  
 
For example, in 2007, Nokia and Tsinghua University announced the 
establishment of a joint research facility in Beijing that will drive technology 
development for Asia and the world. As Zhisheng Niu (2007), the Dean of the 
School of Information Science and Technology at Tsinghua, points out: "China 
has set itself the goal of developing indigenous innovation, and with four times as 
many mobile users as Internet users, the opportunities within mobile technology 
are clear". Another case in point is Nokia's announcement in 2007 of the 
provision of over EUR6 million to China's rural children. This was the largest 
corporate investment in pre-school care and education in rural China by Nokia 
and leading international children's organisation, Plan. The money provided will 
assist more than 1,200 early childhood care and development programs 
throughout the country. "Education is a core component of our corporate social 
responsibility program," said Colin Giles (2007), President of NC when 
announcing this program. His comment suggested that NC is mindful of its social 
obligations in creating a healthy and harmonious China. For its part, Nokia was 
recognised as one of the most respected companies in China in 2004. The award 
paid special attention to social responsibility, innovation, operations and 
commitment to the local market.  
 
In sum, this paper offers new context-specific insights into institutional 
isomorphism which is manifested empirically as incremental conformity to 
regulative processes, institutional norms, cognitive knowledge and meanings 
within the environment. More importantly, this study extends commonly held 
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views of institutional theory to include organisational legitimacy in industrial 
networks. Through an inductive and interpretative case analysis of NC, 
isomorphism has been shown to be a central and multifaceted concept of 
institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Indeed, 
and as much as possible, NC′s behaviours mimic those of key network 
stakeholders, in unison with its social, market, relational and investment 
legitimacy initiatives and imperatives. In this way, institutional isomorphism is 
manifested empirically as "increased conformity" (Westphal, Gulati & Shortell, 
1997), albeit incrementally, at the organisational, network and State level. 
Despite seemingly conflicting and ambiguous demands, commonly accepted 
relational, investment, social and market strategies and initiatives emerge through 
interactions with key stakeholders. Crucially, there are strong incentives for NC 
to conform.  
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper proposed that organisational network legitimacy plays a central role in 
the management of NC's success in China's telecommunications market. In a 
politically sensitive, highly regulated and protected telecommunications market, 
there is heterogeneity in identifiable market, relational, investment and social 
legitimacy that firms can bring to the network of interconnected and 
interdependent stakeholders. These heterogeneities manifest themselves as 
greater pressures on NC to manage its organisational network legitimacy. In the 
presence of the nation′s institutional contextual settings, industry structure, and 
constant ambiguity due to stakeholders' conflicting interests, managing 
organisational legitimacy is therefore both daunting and complex.  
 
Specifically, while building for future legitimacy, NC also needs to exploit its 
past legitimacy, especially in a nation where history and organisational reputation 
matters. The emphasis is on constant and effective exploration, balancing and the 
re-alignment of appropriate market, relational, investment and social legitimacy 
that demonstrates NC's commitment to the interests of its stakeholders and 
acquiring legitimacy from them. The criticality of meeting the government's 
expectations must never be underestimated since the State has historically 
protected, inspired and nurtured both State and non-State enterprises with the 
overall control of resources in a command economy.  
 
NC seems to have grasped the many legitimacy initiatives and nuances through 
its investment in research and development and manufacturing, particularly in 
wireless mobility technology and equipment. NC has also launched a series of 
educational and public welfare initiatives, taking the company beyond the realm 
of only technologically and economically-oriented legitimating initiatives and 
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relationships. By taking what they do well already in technological innovations 
and manufacturing and combining it with NC's societal responsibilities, the 
company has capitalised on its well-established network legitimacy over the past 
two decades.  
 
Finally, while the NC case represents a "polar" case, thereby limiting the 
generality of the findings, "systematic combining" of the contextual analysis of 
data longitudinally provides some empirical support for the proposed interactions 
among concepts comprising the model depicted in Figure 1. In a transitional 
Chinese telecommunications sector, where organisational legitimacy is prone to 
changing over time and is difficult to operationalise for quantitative or qualitative 
research (Schubert, 2008), our proposed conceptual framework could be ideal.  
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